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-4INTRODUCTION
on September 10, 193?, the Catholic Universe Bulletin of
Cleveland carried the following article:
Noted Savant Declares
His Faith in God
Non-Catholic Resigns
Nazi Post to Accept
Papal Honor
VIENNA - (NC) - A scientist so
distinguished that he had been
awarded the Nobel prize and is
one of the savants nruned by His
Holiness Pope Pius XI to the new
Pontifical Academy of Science,
although a non-Catholic,has just
made public confession of faith
in religious belief.
He is Professor Max Planck,one
of the greatest savants in the
domain of natural science •••• 1
Doubtless many .Americans have never heard of Professor
Planck's contributions to scientific knowledge.

Yet to call him

"one of the greatest savants in the domain of natural science" i
not to praise him beyond his due, for his Quantum Theory is the
basis of a large part of contemporary physics • .An international
authority on atomic structure, Neils Bohr, writes, for example:
scarcely any other discovery in
the history of science has produced such extraordinary results
within the short span of our generation as those which have directly arisen from Max Planck's
discovery of the elementary
quantum of action.2
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This discovery was given to the world after years of scholarly research, as a glance at Planck's.life will testify.

He

was born at Kiel, Germany, April 23, 1858 and at seventeen entered the University of Munich with physics his chief

subj~ct.

He studied there and at the University of Berlin, receiving his
doctorate in 1879. 3
Having received his doctorate, )[ax
Planck became a Privat Dozent at the
Kunich University. The Privat Dozent
is a university lecturer who receives
fees but no salary. In 1885 Planck
was appointed Professor of Physics at
the University of Kiel and in 1889 he
came to Berlin as Professor Extraordinari us there. In 1892 he was appointed full professor in succession
to Kirchhoff at the University of
Berlin. In 1912 he became Permanent
Secretary to the Prussian-Academy of
Science. In 1919 he received the Nobel Prize for~Physics. .And in 1926
he became Professor :emeritus,
Schroedinger succeeding him in the
Berlin Chair of Theoretical Physics.
In 1930 Adolf Harnack died and Max
Planck was elected President of the
:Emperor William Society for the Advancement of Science, which is the
highest academic post in Germany.4
This post he resigned in 1937 and became a member of the Papal
Academy of Science.
It was in 1900 that Professor Planck proposed his Quantum.
· Theory as an explanation of a problem of heat radiation.
it soon became evident that Planck
had brought to light something that
not merely explained the puzzle of
the spectrum of radiant heat but
something that is universally fundamental in nature. This was shown
by the gradual appl i cat] on of b] s

Yet

theory in all directions.5
In fact, twentieth century physics consists very largely in
•quantizing" natural phenomena.
Yet with this ever widening application of the Quantum Theory
a new view of nature began to take shape in the minds of scientists.

To what extent the Quantum Theory was responsible for

this new philosophy of science will be determined in Chapter I.
It is true, however, that physical activity began to be looked
upon as the chance motion of many particles rather than as the
ordely movement of determining causes.

From this belief it was

but a step to the denial of the principle of causality.
Max Planck, sensing that this change of opinion would ultimately be hurtful to the best interests of his science, has himself written on the subject of causality in nature.

He has given

to the world his own theory of causation in three recent books,
~

Universe in !!!!. Light of Modern Physics, Where is Science

Going?, and The Philosophy

Et. Ph.ysics.6 These works are true

philosophical literature, for they endeavor to explain the ultimate causes of natural phenomena by means of unaided reason.
To study these three books, codifying their views on causality and examining the philosophical soundness of these views, is
the purpose of the present thesis.

The writer begins his task

i~

no spirit of controversy but simply in the hope that his critique
may clarify the truth.

His first chapter will sketch the origin

of the modern doubt about causality; the remaining chapters will
~n~~inc~

P1Dnck's solution to this doubt.
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Notes to Introduction
l. Catholic Universe Bulletin, Vol. LXIV, No. 11, P• 11.
2. Max Planck, Where is Science Going?, translated by Jam.es
Murphy, Norton, New York, 1932, p. 18.
3. Cf. idem P• 20, 21.

4. Idem, P• 21, 22.
5. Idem, P• 26.

6. These three books are all published by w. w. Norton and Company, ?O Fifth Avenue, New York. Their dates of publication
are 1931, 1932, and 1936 respectively.
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CH.APTER

I

THE PROBLEM OF PROBABILITY
"In these days of rapidly recurring crises,• writes Rev.
James McWilliams, s.J., "it is perhaps not surprising

that there

should be a crisis, if not something approaching actual bankruptcy, in the realm of science.

The most alarming symptom of

this crisis is the frequent assertion that there has been a break
down in the constancy of the physical laws."l

Now this "constanc

as been termed by scientists, rightly or wrongly, 'causality•.•2
Since, then, this constancy seems no longer to exist in nature,
any philosophers of science have concluded that causality likewise is non-existent.
Erwin Schrodinger, who succeeded Planck in the Berlin Chair
of Theoretical Physics, is inclined to hold "the new, a-causal
(i.e.,
says

~necessarily

causal) point of view.•3

sir James Jeans

the "loose jointedness• of the universe "destroys the

tha~

case for absolutely strict causation.•4

Such denials of causalit

are characteristic of many leaders of the New Physics, and we mus
understand their difficulties if we are to appreciate Planck's an
ewer in his theory of causation.

It is the purpose of this chap-

ter, therefore, to consider the modern attitude towards causality
in nature.
The scientific thought of the nineteenth century was dominate
by Classical Physics.
tenets:

This view of nature had two fundamental

first, matter is composed of atoms; second, energy is
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propagated continuously.

Rigid laws governed both the movement

of atoms and the lllliform transfer of energy.

Hence scientists

held that, if they knew the present state of a physical system,
they could describe all the motions that brought it to its present arrangement and could predict with certainty all the activity
that would ensue.
There was, however, one operation in nature that did not seem
to obey their rigid laws.
beam of light.

This was the transfer of energy in a

As we are all aware, light waves carry energy.

If we place our hand in a beam of slllllight, it becomes warm - the
beam has brought energy which we perceive as heat.

The heat en-

ergy received can be accurately determined by allowing the ray to
fall upon a thermometer.
The white light which comes from an incandescent solid, such
as the glowing filament of an electric light bulb, is a mixture
of several colors.

These colors can be separated by a triangular

piece of glass called a prism, as shown in Diagram. 1 on the next
page.

Six colors will be plainly visible: red, orange, yellow,

green, blue, and violet.

Now science has folllld that these colors

are caused by light of different wave-lengths, the red having a
long wave-length, the orange a wave-length slightly shorter, and
so on.

The violet has the shortest wave-length of all.

It is evident from the diagram. that those colors which have
long wave-lengths transmit fewer pulses per second than those
which have short wave-lengths.
transmitted by light.

We have seen that energy is

Now the classical physicist, assuming that

.-10-

Diagram 1
Energy Transfer according to Classical Physics
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each of these colors had a continuous wave motion, would say:
"The red waves have few pulses, therefore they will transmit a
small amount of energy; the orange waves have more pulses, therefore they will transmit more energy; the violet waves have most
pulses, therefore they will transmit most energy."

Accordingly

he would say that if the red waves gave a rise of ten degrees of
temperature, the orange would give a rise of twenty, the yellow,
a rise of thirty, and so on.

In other words, the amount of en-

ergy would increase regularly, and this precisely because each
beam of light flowed on- uniformly, while one beam had more vibrations than another.
Yet when the physicist tried to verify his prediction, he
found that the phenomena did not fit his theory.

At both ends

of the spectrum there is a small amount of energy given off,.
with a sharp rise in temperature at the center (see Diagram. 2).
Thus the red might give an increase of ten degrees, the orange
of twelve, the yellow of twenty, and then the green might bring
the thermometer to forty degrees, while the blue and violet
would fall off again to the low amount of the red and orange.5
In 1900, however, Professor Planck proposed a view radically
different from that of Classical Physics.

"Radiant heat,• he

said, "is not a continuous flow and indefinitely divisible.

It

must be defined as a discontinuous mass ·made up of units all of
which are similar to one another.•6

These units are not all of

the same size: red light has small units of energy, orange light
has larger units, violet light has the largest units of all.
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p1a.nck called these units •quanta•, and his Quantum Theory states
that these quanta are larger for waves with many pulses such as
the violet, and small for waves with few pulses, such as the red.'
This in itself, however, would not have solved the problem,
for if the violet quanta are larger than the green, why do they
not communicate more total energy?

Hence Planck introduced a

further qualification: these quanta are not emitted regularly
like the bullets from a rapid-fire gun; their emission •will depend on the principles of probability.•8
just how this solved the problem can be seen from Diagram 2.
The red quanta are small, that is, they. require little energy to
send them from the source.

Therefore it is very probable that

red quanta will be emitted, and hence the number of red quanta is
large.

One of these quanta, however, has only a very small a-

mount of energy, and therefore, despite the large number of red
quanta, the total energy sent to the red end of the spectrum will
be small.

The violet quanta are large, that is, they contain a

large amount of energy.

Yet, since much energy is needed to emit

a violet quantum, the chances are small that a violet quantum
will be emitted, and hence the total energy at the violet end of
the spectrum will likewise be small.

Somewhere between the red

and the violet will lie a range in which the quanta have a fairly
large amount of energy and for which the probability of emission
is likewise high.

This will be the range of ma.xi.mum temperature.~

The Quantum Theory, therefore, solved the problem of the
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uneven distribution of heat.
ically new view of energy.

This it did by introducing a radClassical Physics had thought of

energy first, as composed of continuous waves, and second, as
emitted steadily from the source.

Quantum Physics maintained

first, that energy was composed of discontinuous particles, and
second, that these particles were emitted at random from the
source.

It is this second tenet that has so greatly influenced

modern scientific thought;

the real significance of the Quantum

Theory for philosophy is not that it solved a problem of heat
radiation, but that it made probability an essential part of tha1
solution.

Let us therefore consider what is implied in the term

"probability".
When a scientist says that one event is more probable than
another he means that, of the two, the former will occur oftener
than the latter if a very large number of trials is made.

The

reason why the former will happen oftener is that there are more
possible ways through which it can come about.

Thus in throwing

dice, of the thirty-six possible combinations of the faces, ther•
is but one combination that will give a two, and hence the probability of throwing a two is l/36.

There are, however, six com-

binations that will give a seven, and hence the probability of
throwing a seven is 6/36 or 1/6.

In a large number of throws,

according to the scientist, seven will thus be thrown six times
oftener than two.10

It is this mathematical concept of proba-

bility which Planck applied in the Quantum Theory.

Just as the
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pro babi li ty of throwing a two is small, so the probability of th
emission of a violet quantum. is small.

.And just as the probabil

itY of throwing a seven is large, so the probability of emission
of a red quantum is large.
But probability has a further meaning.

There is indeed reg-

ularity in the result, regularity for example in the ratio of
throwing a two to that of throwing a seven, but the individual
events are determined purely by chance.

Thus it is mere chance

that a two should result from any particular throw, though the
aggregate effect shows regularity.

Similarly, it is mere chance

which determines that a red quantum should be emitted instead of
a violet one, though the aggregate result will show regularity.
And the reason why one outcome is more probable than another is
simply that the number of possible accidents is greater for one
than for another; the chances for the former are greater.
Diagram 3 on the following page is an attempt to show the
difference between the view of nature adopted by Classical
Physics and that accepted by Quantum Physics. First, to depict a
whole physical state: state A, a body of water at ten degrees
let us say, is always followed by state B, a temperature of
twenty degrees, if the requisite quantity of heat is applied.
The activity is inevitable and unique.
The same rigid laws were believed to govern the individuals
talcing part in the process.

Each atom moves from position l to

position 2, and their movements result in the change of the whol
system.

The activity of the atoms is also inevitable and uni u
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Diagram. 3
Classical Physics

l___1.---..)[.______..I
A

B

q,ua.ntum Physics

c
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D

In Quantum Physics, the process is conceived quite differently.

State A may change to state B or state C or state D.

The

overwhelming probability, perhaps one million to one, is that it
will change to state B.

Yet because the direction is only highly

probable, the activity is neither absolutely inevitable nor necessarily unique.11
Still more at variance is the concept of the activity of the
units.

The atoms move entirely by chance and we have as little

right to call their activity inevitable as we have to call the
outcome of a throw of dice or the spinning
inevitable,

~f

a roulette wheel
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This, then, is the new view of nature which the twentieth
century has brought to scientific thought.

Two beliefs are fun-

damental to this view: first, activity in nature is aggregate activity; second, chance, not order, rules the movement of its unit1.
But why should this new picture of nature bring about a crisiu
in the world of science?

Why, in particular, should scientists

be led to believe "that new physical theories have rendered the
principle of causality null and vo1d"?l2

To answer this question

we must consider how scientific men before the time of the Quantum Theory looked upon causality in nature.
Until the sixteenth century the accepted view of causality
in nature was the scholastic dictum: "Physical beings are determined necessary causes and if left to themselves will produce the
same effects under the same conditions.•13

It was Galileo who

first decided to prescind altogether from metaphysical principles
and "begin with experimental data."14

The course of events which

followed this introduction of a method largely empirical is thus
described by Rev. Joseph Kelly, S.J.:
The scientific genius of men like Tycho
Brahe, Kepler, and Newton produced a picture of the universe in which the actions
of bodies, the laws of nature, and the
order of the world. (were) expressed in
mathematical terms. The accurate results
obtained from this method obscured the
philosophical concepts of the universe •••
A successful investigation of nature was
to be found throuih the experimental
method and the guiding principle was
Physical Determinism, ••• the postulate •••
that natural activity will follow definite modes of action •••
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Whether or not this was dependent upon
the metaphysical principle of causality,
the scientist did not inquire. He was
content that experience justified him in
the use of the principle and that he was
able to generalize his experience and
formulate his laws of nature according
to which physical beings acted ••••
An important consequence of this principle has been a notable emphasis on the
predictability of events. Since nature
is determined in its activity and there
is an invariable sequence of phenomena,
it follows necessarily, as Laplace
states, that if we know sufficiently the
antecedent factors, we can predict the
consequent results. Science bas adopted
this course. This process introduced a
practical identity between predictability
and causality.15

From the foregoing analysis it is evident that the scientific
concept of causality in nature consisted primarily in this: the
philosophical notion of cause was neglected and causality was
identified with predictability.
Now the Quantum Theory denies on principle that absolute predictability can ever be completely verified, for predictability
fails when chance governs the motion of particles. Science can
tell

what will be the most probable configuration of atoms or

quanta, but it cannot predict with certainty.
This, then, is the source of the modern doubt about the existence of causality in nature.

The scientific concept of cause,

a concept which confused causality with predictable succession,
has been shown to be inadequate.
Science, therefore, is faced with a serious crisis.

A de-

cision has to be made between two alternatives: the deniaJ. of

-18-

causality in nature or the assertion that causality holds even in
those atomic processes which seem to be ruled by chance.

Those

who deny causality, the indeterminists, are thus depicted by
Planck:
(They) maintain that there is no genuine
causality or law in nature, and that the
illusion of their existence is due to
the fact that certain rules are found to
occur which are very nearly but not absolutely valid. In principle the indeterminist looks for a statistical foundation for every physical law, even in
that of gravitation; all these laws are
for him laws of probability, referring
to averages drawn from numerous similar
observations, claiming no more than approximate valifity for single observations and always admitting exceptions.16
The second alternative, scientific indeterminism, is describel
by Schrodinger as follows:
We shall maintain that the behavior of
each atom is in every single event determined by rigid causality. .And we
shall even contend that strictly causal determinism of the elementary processes, although we cannot observe their
details, must necessarily be admitted,
in order to allow the mass phenomena,
which result from their operation, to
be treated by the methods of statistics
and the probability calculus. From
this viewpoint causality would lie at
the basis of statistical law.l?
Scientists have taken sides upon these two alternatives.
Some, such as Heisenberg and Dirac, are indeterminists; others,
like Professor Einstein, favor the determinist view.
however, is significant.

One thing,

Both sides mean by "causal.ity" exactly

what science has always meant by it:

predictable succession. ThE
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indeterm.inists deny that equations can be found which will describe the chance activity of particles; the determinists look
for a higher mathematical synthesis which will explain all

motio~

of atoms and quanta.
Into this controversy, in part at least precipitated by his
Quantum Theory, Professor Planck has entered.

He has endeavored

to solve the problem of probability with what we have called his
theory of causation.

It remains now to examine that theory.

Fol

clarity's sake we shall consider his views under three headings:
causality in the individual instance, causality as a universal
law, and the relation of causality to free will.
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CHAPTER II
INDIVIDUAL CAUSATION
Since causality is nothing but an explanation of change in
the real world, any adequate theory of causality must first answer the question: Does the external world exist?

Dr. Planck

replies in the affirmatiTe in his first philosophical book by
appealing to "reason• or "common sense.•l

In his next book,

Where is Science Goins?, he gives two "theorems•:
(1) There is a real outer world which
exists inde~endently of our act of knowing, and (2} The real outer world is not
directly knowable.2
.
Planck calls these propositions theorems because he maintains
that they are not provable loiically but are rather truths which
it is necessary for us to assume.

This point of view is stated

more explicitly in a later chapter of his second work:
In other words, the fundamental principles and indispensable postulates of
every ienuinely productive science are
not based on pure logic but rather on
the metaphysical hypothesis -which no
rules of logic can refute - that there
exists an outer world which is entirely
independent of ourselTes.... ·
Once the scientist has begun by taking
his leap into the transcendental he
never discusses the leap itself nor worries about it. If-he did science could
not advance so rapidly. .And anyhow which is fundamentally a consideration
of no less importance - this line of
conduct cannot be refuted as inconsistent on logical grounds.3
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According to Planck, therefore, the existence of the external
world is an assumption which it is necessary to make at the beginning of any scientific investigation, an hypothesis which has
the merit of self-consistency.

In our critique of his theory in

the second part of this chapter we shall endeavor to show that
our belief in the existence of the rea.l world can rest on

oth~r

and more compelling evidence.
Like the existence of the real world, eausall.ity seems to be
something independent of us:
••• the conclusion to which we are led is
that causality is something fundamental.
We suspect that it is ultimately indepen•
dent of our senses and of our intelligence and is deeply rooted in that world
of reality where a direct scientific
scrutiny becomes impossible. For surely
it will be admitted that even if the
earth with all its inhabitants were to
perish, the cosmic events would still
continue to obey their causal laws, even
though no human being were alive to test
the meaning and justification of such a
claim.4
Since the world exists, causality exists; the mind may as reasonably admit the latter as the form.er.
What, then, is the nature of causality?

Dr. Planck continues:

I propose to commence the next stage
with the simple and general proposition
that an event is causally conditioned
if it can be foretold with certainty.
Of course I mean no more by this than
that the possibility of correctly foretelling the future is a safe criterion
of the presence of a causal connection;
I do not mean that the two are identical. To take a familiar instance: during the day we can foretell the coming

-23-

of night with certainty and we may hence
infer that the night has a cause; but we
do not for that reason treat day as being
the cause of night. On the other hand
it frequently happens that we assume the
existence of a causal nexus where it is
wholly impossible to make a correct forecast. T~s applies, for example, to the
weather.
predictability seems, therefore,to be a safe criterion of causality.
Yet, as Dr. Planck continues his analysis, he is confronted
with a difficulty in the practical order:
On further scrutiny, however, we reach
a very remarkable discovery. However
simple the conditions which we select
and however delicate our instruments, we
shall never be able to calculate in advance the result of the measurement with
absolute accuracy, i.e. so as to agree
to all places of decimals with the number measured. There always remains an
element of inaccuracy. This is not the
case in purely mathematical calculations,
e.g. when the square root of 2 is calculated, which can be stated with complete
accuracy to any number of places. And
what applies to mechanics and heat is
true of all the branches of physics, e.g.
of electrical and optical events.
The available facts accordingly compel
us to admit that the state of affairs mS\Y'
be correctly summed up by saying that in
no single instance is it possible accurately to predict a physical event.
If we place this fact in juxtaposition
with the proposition from which we
started previously, when it was said
that an event is causally determined if
it can be accurately predicted, we find
ourselves faced with an inconvenient but
inescapable dilemma. If we rigidly
maintain our original proposition then
nature does not present us with a single
instance where it is possible to assert
that there is a caus&l connection; if we
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insist that somehow room must be found
for strict cauraJ:Jty then we are compelled in some respect to modify the
proposition from which we started.6
This is the dilemma which we discussed in Chapter I (p. 17,
18) and there we indicated the two solutions: determinism, which
still believes in causality, and indeterminism, which calls all
laws of nature statistical.

Planck accepts the former solution,

as he makes clear in the following passage:
In point of fact, statistical laws are
dependent on the assumption of the strict
law of causality functioning in each particular case. And the non-fulfillment of
the statistical rule in particular cases
is not therefore due to the fact that the
law of causality is not fulfilled, but
rather to the fact that our observations
are not sufficiently delicate and accurate
to put the law of causality to a direct
test in each case. If it were possible
for us to follow the movement of each individual molecule in this very intricate
labyrinth of processes, then we should
find in each case &fl exact fulfillment of
the dynamical laws.
The •dynamical laws" are the pbysical laws which suppose predictable causality.

Hence, according to Planck, causality does exist

in nature, for statistical laws suppose that the individual is
moved by some other being.

Furthermore, his criterion of causal-

ity, predictability, could really be had but for our limited
knowledge, and is had by an omniscient intellect:
••• we are induced to assume that an ideal
intellect having complete knowledge of
to-day's pbysical events in all places
should be in a position to foretell tomorrow's weather with complete accuracy.
The same applies to every forecast of
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physical events.a
These, then, are the first steps in Dr. Planck's theory of
causation: (1) The external 'World must be assumed to exist; (2)
causality, whose criterion is predictability, is as real as that
orld; (3) in individual cases we

m~

,not be able to predict, yet

the activity of nature is causal and can be predicted by an omiscient intellect.

Let us now consider each of these points

philosophically.
First, the external world must be assumed to exist.

The ex-

istence of the world should certainly be established at the beginning of any philosophical inquiry, for if we are to explain
what takes place in the world we must first be sure that the
world exists.

However, Dr. Planck does not establish this fact

but merely takes it for granted, as his words "theorem,•9 •bypothesis,•10 "leap into the transcendentai,•11 clearly show.
Now it is quite true that we cannot reason

~

the existence of

the external world, yet we can adduce abundant evidence for its
existence.

Let us briefly examine some of this evidence.

Fundamental to this whole inquiry is the aptitude of the mind
for truth.

If our knowing faculties are capable of attaining re-

ality, then we
does exist.

m~

use their testimony to show that the world

But our knowing faculties are apt for truth, since

to deny that they are involves a self-contradiction.

One who

asserts that his intellect is perpetually deceiving him equivalently declares that he can be sure of nothing.

Yet he cannot
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denY the validity of knowledge without being certain of at least
one thing - that knowledge is of itself failible.

He is con-

vinced that he must doubt, hence he maintains that the necessity
of doubting is most certain and undeniable.

Such a state of mind

however, manifestly contradicts itself, for the sceptic is sure o
nothing and sure of something (the necessity of doubting} at one
and the same time.

Universal doubt, therefore, and hence the hon

est denial of the aptitude of the mind for truth,is impossible.12
Furthermore, there are many things of which we are naturally,
spontaneously certain.

As soon as we know what is meant by a

"thing" we realize that a thing cannot be and not be at one and
the same time.

We also know with certitude that twice two is

four, that the whole is greater than its part, and many other
self-evident truths.

Now in our very knowledge of these things,

we make an implicit act of reflection, that is, we look at the
subject and the predicate of the statement, see that these apprehensions represent reality, see that these realities are connected., and see further that we are justified in giving our assen
precisely because the matter is as we judge it to be.

In other

words, we implicitly see the nature of our cognition to be an
accurate representation of reality; we verify the aptitude of the
mind for truth.13
Having shown that the mind is trustworthy, we may now consider the evidence which it offers in support of the existence of
the external world.

The first fact is the •concept of external-

-27-

ity, which cannot be accounted for•l4 unless there is something
beyond the thinking subject, for
If a man were living on an estate so vast
that he could never reach the boundaries
of it, he would never know - of his own
knowledge - that it had any, and so that
there was anything outside it or that he
himself was within it •••• If, as the Idealists suppose, this state of affairs
could be extended to all our knowledge,
so that we could never know anything external to it, we could know nothing as
internal either, and the distinction between the two could not be drawn.15
Other facts are the distinction which we make between possiblE
!things and things which actually exist,the distinction between thE
~hinge

which we fancy and the things which we labor to produce,

and the distinction between truth and error.

The only explanatior.

which can be given for our even adverting to these differences
is the existence of the external world.16
The facts just cited are neither assumptions nor logical
processes.

They are, if you wish, experimental evidence which

anyone may verify for himself.

Had Dr. Planck based his theory

on some such evidence, his further reasoning would have a more
solid foundation.

The fact that he did not is, in our mind, a

basic defect.
Second, causality, whose criterion is predictability, is as
real as the external world.

Dr. Planck declares, therefore, that

the concepts of cause and effect have objective validity.

Yet he

seems to confuse the criterion of causality with causality itself1
for no sooner does he begin to discuss causality than he devotes
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entire attention to predictability:
When we say that there is a causal
connection between two events, we
mean that there is some kind of law
connecting them, the earlier event
being called the cause, and the latter the effect. The question then
arises as to what is the specific
nature of the nexus between them.
Is there any criterion permitting us
to say that a given natural event is
the effect of another?17
Now, although we may know the criterion of the presence of a

thing, our knowledge is incomplete until we grasp its nature.
Thus no chemist would be content to know merely that starch turns
blue at the presence of iodine;

he wants to discover the nature

and further properties of the iodine molecule.

Accordingly, it

seems to us that a phi.losopher should not rest satisfied with the
statement that predictability is a criterion of causality; he
should examine the origin, content, and verification of the concept of cause.

This threefold analysis, applied by Planck himselj"

to scientific ideas,18

reveals the following facts.

The numerous changes taking place in the world about us are
among the first objects of our experience.

As we grow older we

observe that we ourselves can make things change by moving them,
altering their shape, or converting them into other things.

We

notice that in every change an object already existing acts.
These facts are altogether unrelated in our mind, however, until
we begin to ask the question,
a particular change?

Why?

What reason can we assign for

Obviously the thing which has just begun to
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exi st is not the reason for its own existence since before it ex~sted

it was unable to act.

sought outside it.

The reason for its existence must be

This reason we call a cause.

Furthe:rmore, we soon learn to know just what causes are responsible for certain effects.

The bruise on our forehead re-

sulted from the causal influx of a particular stone; the heavy
weight on the floor owes its present position to me.

We acquire

the concept of cause, therefore, by asking the question, "Why do
things change?• and noting the influx of physical agents.

Hence

a cause is that which by its physical action produces another
being which of itself cannot exist.19
Having examined the origin and content of the concept of
cause, let us now consider the verification of this concept in
nature.

First of all, we may say that, in general, natural ob-

jects are true causes.

The same senses which bring us knowledge

of the external world represent objects as acting upon us; thus
not only do I perceive heat, but I perceive the heat of a fire,
and I perceive that the fire is hot.20

Now if the fire were not

the cause of the heat which I feel, I ought merely to experience
a sensation of warm.th without acknowledging any source of that
warm.th.

Either, then, the fire is really a cause or my senses

err about a most evident object and I am compelled to deny their
veracity, saying that the real world which I know through them is
only an illusion.

This admission is altogether untenable, as we

have shown above (p. 26).

In other words, my senses reveal that
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beinga are causes just as surely as they reveal the existence of
things about me.
When we try to find a particular cause for a particular effect, however, we often meet with difficulties.

The interplay of

forces in nature's activity is so complicated that frequently we
are at a loss to decide which precise natural agents are responsible for an individual effect.

We do observe that certain

things are required to produce a particular object: sunlight,air,
and nourishment are needed for the growth of a plant.

We note

that if these are there in the proper proportions, the plant will
mature; if they are absent, the plant will die.

This is not a

mere perception of succession - we understand that the plant depends upon these factors.21

And because the effect inevitably

results from these antecedents we can say that this inevitability
is a criterion of the presence of causal action.

Now"inevitable"

means for the observer the same as "predictable" - he can forecast the result because it will always follow.

Hence predictabil-

ity may with justice be called a criterion of causality.
Predictability, however, is merely an external sign that a
being is a cause.
predict?

What is the intrinsic reason why I am able to

It must be that the internal nature of the agent is so

constituted that it will necessarily act if the required conditions are present.22

We know that natural bodies act; therefore

they have some internal source of activity. We know that natural
bodies.must act if the required conditions are present;therefore
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thi S source of activity is endowed with a necessity for action.
Necessity, however, can be either absolute or contingent.23
Thus it is absolutely necessary that twice two should equal four.
AnY other result from this multiplication is simply impossible,
and therefore the doubling of two is determined to one result independently of any conceivable circumstance.

The activity of

bodies, on the other hand, is not determined to one result with
the same absolute necessity, for it would not involve a contradiction in terms if some natural cause, given all the required
perceptible conditions, would not act.

The actions of bodies are

truly determined to one thing, yet that determination is not absolutely binding, for its cessation involves no internal contradiction.

Such necessity we may call contingent to distinguish it

from absolute or independent necessity.
The necessity with which bodies act, therefore, is a contingent or dependent necessity.
pend to be effective?

Upon what does this necessity de-

Clearly it does not depend on the cooper-

ation of natural bodies or of man himself - the laws of nature
can be set aside by neither.

Only He Who is indispensable for

the existence of a body can be likewise indispensable for its activity, and therefore it is upon God that natural causes depend
for their effectiveness.

Let us briefly consider the reasoning

which leads us to this affir.rnation.24
The world exists outside the mind, as we have seen, and the
intellect gives us accurate information about this world.

Indi-
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vi dual beings which we observe in this world do not by their very
nature demand existence, for there was a time when they were not
and there comes a time when they cease to be what they are. Hence

these beings need a cause for their existence.

.An infinite

serie1~

of finite causes cannot explain the real world for the whole
series is just as impotent as is each member to produce its own
being.

Therefore some uncaused cause must ultimately be respon-

sible for whatever exists.
call God.

This uncaused, self-existent Being we

He must be one, absolutely simple; composition implies

another cause, a composer.

If simple, immutable; change presup-

poses duality: a given perfection and a capacity for further perfection.

God, then, is infinitely perfect, for He lacks all ca-

pacity for further perfection.
It is clear, then, that natural causes depend on God at least
for their beginning.

But their activity must also depend on Him,

for if one of His creatures could act independently of Him God
would not be all-perfect.

His power would be limited, since that

creature would not be subject to Him.25

The harmony of the uni-

verse points to a Supreme Lawgiver Who implanted in His creatures
tendencies to orderly activity.26

But if that Lawgiver could not

set aside those laws in some particular case to achieve a higher
end He would not be a ruler but a subject of His own vassals.
Dr. Planck's third point, that in individual cases we may not
be able to predict, yet that prediction can be had by an omniscient intellect, is elucidated in the light of what we have just
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s een.

This omniscient intellect, which for Planck may be just a

mere abstraction, is a real Being, Who suffers neither from lack
of knowledge nor lack of power and can therefore see the true
causes which may be unknown to us as well as direct their activi tY according to His most wise designs.

Dr. Planck, therefore, considers individual causation in its
threefold aspect: the existence of the real world, the criterion
of causality, the explanation of exceptions.

We have endeavored

to show where his doctrine is inadequate, basing our analysis on
evidence available to all.

Our conclusions, that the external

world most assuredly does exist, that predictability is based on
contingent necessity, and that exceptions are to be explained not
only through our ignorance but also through God's omnipotence,
will, we trust, be admitted as readily as the facts on which
they rest.
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CHAPTER

III

THE LAW OF CAUSALITY

The second aspect of causation which Dr. Planck discusses is
he principle or law of causality.

This principle states: "What-

ver exists contingently requires an efficient cause for its ex·stence, "land the point at issue is to determine whether this
rinciple is true universally or not.
event a contradiction in terms?

Is an uncaused contingent

If so, then the statement "What-

ever happens is caused" is absolutely certain and valid for all
ast, present, and future events.
That Dr. Planck understands the problem precisely as we have
stated it is evident from the following quotation.

His second

sentence is identical in meaning with our formulation of the
principle of causality, for "whatever exists contingently" is
the same as "every event in every instance":
When we find ourselves face to face
with an event which we cannot possibly
refer to any cause or series of causes,
and which lies outside the range of all
the causes we are familiar with, then
what happens? Is it perfectly certain
and necessary that for every event in
every instance there must be a corresponding cause? Would the thought involve a logical contradiction that in
this or that case the event has absolutely happened of itself and has no
causal relation whatever to any other
event? Of course the answer is in the
neg~tive; for it is very easy to think
of an event as having no explanatory
cause whatsoever. In such cases we
speak of miracles and wonders and magic. And the simple fact that there

-37exists a whole range of literature whose
scenes are laid in wonderland is proof in
itself that the concept of strict causality is not an inherent necessity of human
thought. Indeed the human mind finds
little difficulty in thinking of everything in the world as turning topsy-turvy.
We can say to ourselves that to-)morrow
the sun may rise in the east,l* for a
change. We can say to ourselves that a
miracle of nature may occur, contrary to
all the known laws of nature. We can
think of the Niagra Falls for instance as
shooting upwards, though this would be
impossible in the world of reality. I
can think of the door of my room in which
I am now writing as opening of its own
accord. .And I can think of historical
personages as entering the room and standing beside my table. In the world of reality to talk of such events may be meaningless and we may call them impossible,
at least in our everydasr way of reasoning.
But we must distinguish this kind of impossibility from a logical impossibility,
such as the idea of a square circle or
that the part of something is greater
than the whole, for no matter what efforts we make to think such things we
cannot think them, inasmuch as they entail an inner contradiction. We can
think of a part and we can think of the
whole to which it belongs but we cannot
think of the part as greater than the
whole. This kind of impossibility is
inherent in the nature of human thought
itself, whereas the idea of something
happening outside the range of causation is quite logically coherent.
Thus from the outset we can be quite
clear about one very important fact,
namely, that the validity of the law
of causation cannot be decided on
grounds of abstract reasoning.2
Dr. Planck holds, therefore, that human reason cannot prove
the necessity of the principle of causality.

According to him,

"A strictly causal way of looking at things ••• is wholly compat-
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ible with modern physics although its necessity cannot be demonstrated either~ priori or~ posteriori."3
But, since the principle of causality cannot be proved valid,
is it then to be rejected?

No, answers Dr. Planck, it is to be

assumed in the same way as the existence of the real world is
assumed:
Having once assumed the existence of an
independent external world, science concomitantly assumes the principle of causality as a concept entirely independent
of sense-perception. In applying this
principle to the study of natural phenomena science first investigates if and
how far the law of causal relation is applicable to the various happenings in the
world of nature and in the realm of the
human spirit. Science finds itself here
exactly on the same footing which Kant
took as the starting-point of his theory
of knowledge. As in the case of Kantian
philosophy, so also in the case of each
special branch of science the causal concept is accepted at the outset as belonging to those categories without which no
progress in knowledge can be made. But
we must make a certain differentiation
here. Kant took not merely the concept
of causality but also to a certain degree the meaning of the causal law itself
as an immediate datum of knowledge and
therefore universally valid. Specialized
science cannot go thus far. It must
rather confine itself to the question as
to what significance the law of causality
can be proved to have in each individual
case, and thus through research give
practical meaning and value to the empty
framework of the causal concept.4
In other words, science must assume the principle of causality but not as unequivocally as it assumes the existence of the
external world.

Science is prepared to accept the world as it
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seems to be; science is prepared to acknowledge the principle of
causality only in those cases which she has tested.

The princi-

ple of causality is therefore a helpful guide in understanding
nature but not an absolutely certain law.

This point of view is

summed up by Planck in the following sentence:
It is true that the law of causality
cannot be demonstrated any more than
it can be logically refuted: it is
neither correct nor incorrect; it is a
heuristic principle; it points the way,
and in my opinion it is the most valuable pointer that we possess in order
to find a path through the confusion of
events, and in order to know in what
direction scientific investigation must
proceed so that it shall reach useful
results. 5
From the above quotations it is clear that Planck's views on
the law of causality can be reduced to three: (1) An uncaused
contingent event is not a contradi·ction in terms; ( 2) the principle of causality cannot be demonstrated; (3) therefore this
principle is not universal but to be acknowledged by science
when circumstances justify its validity.

Let us now consider

the philosophical soundness of each of these three tenets.
First, an uncaused contingent event is not a contradiction
in terms, for we can "think of an event as having no explanatory
cause whatsoever,"6 whereas we cannot think of a square circle o
of a part greater than its whole, since these concepts "entail
an inner contradiction."?

Let us examine the validity of this

proof.
When we "think of an event as having no explanatory cause
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whatsoever,"

what precisely have we in mind?

Are we trying to

conceive a causeless contingent event or are we simply representing nature as acting in an unaccustomed way?

From all of Dr.

Planck's examples it is evident that we are doing the latter. Now
as we saw in Chapter II (p. 31), nature's laws are not absolutely
necessary; their abrogation does not involve a contradiction in
terms.

The cessation of accustomed physical activity, as was men·

tioned, is not self-contradictory, and hence conceivable.

There-

fore Dr. Planck's argument merely proves that we can represent
nature as acting differently - a fact which does not reach the
point of the problem.
The point at issue is not: "Can nature act differently?" but
"Can an event happen absolutely of itself?"8

This problem,since

it deals with a universal law, is similar to the problem of the
whole and its part.

Dr. Planck has shown how the latter is to

be solved: by forming a concept of 'whole and part and seeing if
there is "an inner contradiction."9

This method, which supposes

that opposition of ideas argues incompatibility of realities, is
perfectly valid, for the mind represents reality truly.

Hence we

shall analyze the concepts "an event" and "happen absolutely of
itself" to see if they "entail an inner contradiction."
An event, i.e. a contingent happening, is one which does not

exist necessarily; its nature does not demand existence but is
indifferent to it.10

Hence an event "happens" - it is possible

for it to exist and it is possible for it to cease to exist;
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there is no iron law of its inner essence requiring that it come
into being.

Yet, as a matter of fact, events do come into being •

tbe happenings of daily life, the changes taking place in the external world are nothing but contingent occurrences which could bE
otherwise. Now when faced with an actual event, we naturally ask,
"Why does it exist?"

reason for the thing.

That question, "Why?" demands the sufficien1
Now it is as certain as the principle of

contradiction that every single thing has a sufficient reason,
that is, has everything needed to make it what it is.

He who de-

nies this principle asserts that a thing can exist without what
is indispensable for its existence - a manifest contradiction.11
Clearly the reason for the existence of the event is not itself,
for then it would have produced itself; it would have existed before it actually was.

Therefore the reason for its existence

must be sought outside it, in some other being.
~e

This other being

call a cause.
The analysis which we have just made applies to every event

which happens, for all are alike in this, that the sufficient reason for their existence is not within them, and therefore in some
external cause.

Hence no event can happen absolutely of itself,

for the idea "event" demands an external cause and the idea "happens absolutely of itself" denies that such a cause exists.

In

other words, the principle of causality, "Whatever exists contingently requires an efficient cause for its existence,nl2 is as
certain as the statement, "The whole is greater than any of its
parts."

-42This conclusion, that the principle of causality is absolutely certain, proves that an uncaused contingent event ia a contradiction in terms, and therefore that the first of Dr. Planck'E
views on the law of causality is inadmissible.

His second tenet,

that the principle of causality cannot be demonstrated, is shown
false by the same investigation.

Our analysis did estaQJ.ish the

necessity of the principle of causality, for the predicate, "requires a cause," is necessarily connected with the subject,"contingent event," and that connection is known by the mind from
the nature of the terms.

The reason for this necessary connec-

tion is the intrinsic nature of the objects represented, which,
as is evident from the above analysis, demands their interconnection.13
Because the judgment, "Every contingent event requires a
cause," is analytic, i.e. derived from an analysis of subject
and predicate, it is absolutely universal, for it fits the naturE
of the thing wherever foundl4 since the concepts "contingent event" and "caused" represent two essences and prescind from this
or that individual.

These concepts are true, for the mind rep-

resents things as they are; therefore, wherever and whenever a
contingent event takes place, it is absolutely necessary that it
proceed from a cause.

Hence Dr. Planck's third point, that the

principle of causality is not universal, must be denied.
From this chapter it is evident, then, that we cannot agree
with Dr. Planck in holding that the law of causality is neither

-43pecessary, demonstrable, nor universal.
~iew

We must maintain, in

of the facts cited, that this principle is necessary,certain,

and absolutely universal. And hence, in the words of Msgr. Sheen,
If the principle of causality is metaphysical and transcendental, if by its
nature its foundation is its indirect
relation with the principle of identity,
it is therefore independent of time and
space; if its objectivity is grounded on
an abstractive communion with the real,
it follows that the physical theories no
more affect its validity than the discovery of manganese affects mother-love.15
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IV

CAUSATION AND FREE WILL
We have seen that a cause is a heing which by its physical
action brings something into existence. 1 In the sense of this
definition human beings are most assuredly causes, yet the fact
that we do produce things in the external world gives rise to a
problem.

If we are true causes, it seems that, given all the re

quired conditions,we should inevitably produce a definite effect.
such a supposition, however, contradicts experience by denying
freedom to the human will.

Let us see how Dr. Planck solves thi

difficulty.
First we must consider precisely how Dr. Planck understands
the problem of causation and free will.

He puts the question

in the following words:
This is one of man's oldest riddles.
How can the independence of human vo11 tion be harmonized with the· fact that
we are integral parts of a universe
which is subject to the rigid order of
nature's laws?
At first sight these two aspects of
human existence seem to be logically
irreconcilable. On the one hand we
have the fact that natural phenomena
invariably occur according to the
rigid sequence of cause and effect.
This is an indispensable postulate of
all scientific research, not merely in
the case of those sciences that deal
with the physical aspects of nature,
but also in the case of the mental
sciences, such as psychology. Moreover, the assumption of an unfailing
causal sequence in all happenings is
the basis on which our conduct of

-46everyday life is regulated. But, on the
other hand, we have our most direct and
intimate source of knowledge, which is
the human consciousness, telling us that
in the last resort our thought and volition are not subject to this causal order. The inner voice of consciousness
assures us that at any given moment we
are capable of willing this or that alternative. 2
Again,
Each one of us is an integral part of
the world in whic,h we live. If every
other event in the universe be a link
in the causal chain, which we call the
order of nature, how can the act of
human volition be looked upon as independent of that order? The principle of causation is either universally
applicable or it is not. If not,where
do we draw the line, and why should
one part of creation be subject to a
law that of its nature seems universal,
and another part be exempted from that
law?3
From these citations it is evident that Dr. Planck conceives
the problem as an antinomy between the principle of causality and
the freedom of the hum.an will.

However, he understands by the

"principle of causality• something quite different from the principle which we discussed in Chapter III.

His words, "natural

phenomena invariably occur according to the rigid sequence of
cause and effect," "the rigid order of nature's laws," and "the
causal chain, which we call the order of nature,"4 show that when
he talks of causation he is thinking of the uniformity of nature's activity.

That is to say, the principle of causality can

have two meanings: (1) Every contingent thing must have a cause,
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It is the second meaning of this principle which Dr.

Planck has in mind.
In Chapter III we have shown that the principle of causality,
understood in its first meaning, is necessary, certain, and absolutely universal (p. 40 - 43).

We said nothing about the

second meaning of this principle; we shall consider this second
meaning in the latter part of this chapter.

Dr. Planck, however,

as is evident from his indiscriminate use of both forms,5 does
not distinguish between the two.

For him it is the same to say,

"Every contingent thing must have a cause," as "Every cause will
produce its effect under the required conditions."
Furthermore, Dr. Planck, although he maintains that the validity of the principle of causality "cannot be decided on
grounds of abstract reasoning,"6 believes nevertheless that this
principle"is an indispensable postulate of all scientific research," even for psychology.?

Hence science must hold, accord-

ing to him, that "natural phenomena invariably occur according to
the rigid sequence of cause and effect."8

Mental phenomena (in-

cluding volition), it would seem, must therefore be necessarily
determined.·
But perhaps the principle of causality, understood as requiring that every cause must produce its effect, is not universal.

Perhaps there are exceptions to "the rigid sequence of

cause and effect."9

If there are, then human volition can be

exempted from "the causal chain."10

Accordingly, Dr. Pl:an.ck
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For our present purpose it is much more
important to ask whether the causal connection between events must be condidered
as absolutely complete and always unbroken or are there events in the world
which do not enter the chain as connecting links?ll
Because philosophers have differed so widely in their answers to this question, Dr. Planck decides that he cannot get a
satisfactory answer from them and accordingly turns to science.12
He observes that the physical sciences, physics, astronomy, chemistry, and mineralogy "are all based on the strict and universal
validity of the principle of causality. "13

Biology,. too, "sets

its face against permitting exceptions as such to exist.nl4
Next Dr. Planck turns to "those sciences which deal with human events," history and sociology.15

According to his theory

that we must test the validity of the principle of causality in
each individual case,16 he considers a particular person:
That individual personality has inherited
qualities such as bodily conformation,
intelligence, imaginative capacity, temperament, personal tastes and so on.
Working on this personality we have the
physical and psychic influences of the
environment, such as climate, food, upbringing, companionship, family life,
education, reading, etc. Now the question is whether all these data determine
the conduct of this personality in all
its particulars and according to definite
laws. In other words if we suppose, what
is impossible in practice, that we had a
thorough and detailed knowledge of all
these factors here and now, could we tell
with certainty, on the causal basis, how
the individual will act a moment hence?l7
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••• I think that it may be said definitely
that the direction which the humanist
sciences, such as psychology and history,
are developing nowadays furnishes certain
grounds for presuming that the question
should be answered in the affirmative.
The part which force plays in nature, as
the cause of motion, has its counterpart
in the mental sphere in motive as the
cause of conduct. Just as at each and
every moment the motion of a material
body results necessarily from the combined action of many forces, so human
conduct results with the same necessity
from the interplay of mutually reinforced or contradicting motives which
partly in the conscious and partly also
in the unconscious sphere work their way
forward towards the result.i8
According to Dr. Planck, therefore, motives inevitably determine conduct and hence the principle of causality, understood
as meaning "Every cause produces its effect under the required
conditions" applies to human volition.

In Planck's theory, man'E

power of choice, i.e. his will, is determined to one line of activity by the conditions and motives which influence it.
After he has proposed this deterministic solution, however,
Dr. Planck forsees two difficulties which attend it, and these
he attempts to solve.
The first difficulty is the fact that predictability, his
criterion of causality, does not seem to be verified for the
actions of men.

Dr. Planck admits that "it is perfectly true

that many acts which are done by human beings
explicable."19

~ppear'to

be in-

Yet he solves this problem just as he solved the

-50-

problem of non-predictability for the actions of natural bodies:
be asserts that we cannot predict because of lack of knowledge o
the influencing motives and that such knowledge is within the
power of higher intelligences.

In his own words:

The conclusion, therefore, is that the
highest types of human intelligence are
subject to the causal law in the processes that result in even their greatest
achievements. That is the first part of
our conclusion. And the second part is
that in principle we must reckon with the
possibility that a day will come when the
more profound and increasingly more refined development of scientific research
will be able to understand the mental
workings not only of the ordinary mortal
but also of the highest human genius in
their causal relations; because scientific
thought is identical with causal thought,
so much so that the last goal of every
science is the full and complete application of the causal principle to the object of research.20
The second difficulty which confronts Dr. Planck is the fact
that his solution contradicts the testimony of consciousness that
man is free.

In attempting to reconcile his determinism with hu-

man liberty Dr. Planck proposes a most subtile explanation. Freedom, according to him, does not consist in being free but in feel
ing free.

This opinion is stated in the first of his three phil-

osophical books:
The existence of strict causality implies
that the actions, the mental processes,
and especially the will of every individual are completely determined at any
given moment by the state of his mind,
taken as a whole, in the previous moment, and by any influences acting upon
him coming from the external world. We
have no reason whatever for doubting the
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truth of this assertion. But the question of free will is not concerned with
the question whether there is such a
definite connection, but whether the
person in question is aware of this connection. This, and this alone,determines
whether a person can or cannot feel free.
If a man were able to forecast his future
solely on the ground of causality, then
and then only we would have to deny this
consciousness of freedom of the will.21
Since freedom is made the same as feeling free, it is perfeatly conceivable that a man should think himself free and yet
be determined.

This is precisely the case, according to Dr.

Planck, and the reason why the internal necessitating force cannot be perceived is that the very act by which we reflect on our
volition is an unperceived motive which influences the will. This
opinion is stated in his first book:
Complete knowledge implies that the object. apprehended is not altered by any
events taking place in the knowing subject; and if subject and object are identical this assumption does not apply.
To put it more concretely, the knowledge
of any motive or any activity of the
will is an inner experience, from which
a fresh motive may spring; consequently
such an awareness increases the number
of possible motives. But as soon as this
is recognized, the recognition brings
about a fresh act of awareness, which in
its turn can gaierate yet another activity of the will. In this wa:y the chain
proceeds, without it ever being possible
to reach a motive which is definitely
decisive for any future action; in other
words, to reach an awareness which is
not in 'its turn the occasion of a fresh
act of the will.22
This opinion is reiterated in his second book:
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••• I am saying that in principle there is
no reason why we should not discover the
causal connections in our own personal
conduct, but that in practice we can
never do so because this would mean that
the observing subject would also be the
object of research. And that is impossible, for no eye can see itself .23
Two brief citations from his third book show that his belief
has not been altered:
••• every application of the law of causality to the will of the individual and
every information gained in this way [by
introspection] is itself a motive acting
upon the will, so that the result which
is being looked for is continually being
changed.24
In
at
is
at

other words, we might say that looked
from outside (objectively) the will
causally determined, and that looked
from inside (subjectively) it is free.25

We have quoted at considerable length from the books of Dr.
Planck in order to present his opinion precisely and to show
that it is the same in all his philosophical works.

Let us now

look into his views on the whole question of causality and free
will.
The question, as we have stated, is an apparent antinomy between the principle of causality and our consciousness that we
are free.

We may tabulate Dr. Planck's views on this antithesis

as follows: (1) The principle of causality requires that every
cause produce its effect under the required conditions; (2) motive, the cause of conduct, determines the will; (3) a superior
intelligence could predict any ma.n's acts, given the knowledge

-54bodies, that the scientist deals.

Hence he may with confidence

rely on the constancy of their activity.

It is only when he

says that the power to act in every cause is determined that he
reasons beyond the evidence.
There is evidence to show that the power to act in physical
bodies is determined; this we have seen in Chapter II (p. 30)
But there is likewise evidence to show that the power of choice
in hum.an beings is not determined.

To rule out this latter ev-

idence it is not enough to say that science finds the principle
of causality indispensable for its researches.26

What science

does need is assurance that nature's laws are uniform.

This ev-

idence we have given in Chapter II (p. 30) without prejudice to
the existence of free causes.
Yet it may be urged that the "sciences which deal with human
events:2? history and sociology, assume that hum.an beings do act
in a definite way from definite motives.

We shall examine this

point more fully in treating of motive as a cause of conduct.
However, we may note here that to assert freedom is not to deny
rationality to man.

The humanist sciences do assume that man

will act reasonably, but if they maintain as certain that man
acts necessarily in all that he does then they are simply asserting something which they have not proved and which is contradicted by a wealth of evidence.
Hence Dr. Planck's first point, that every cause must produce
its effect under the required conditions, is an interpretation
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kinds of causes and has not been proved to extend to man.

Con-

sequently, when human freedom is the point at issue,it is beggin
the question to assume that every cause must act necessarily especially when no reasons other than an unproved postulate of
science are offered in support of this position.28
Second, motive, the cause of conduct, determines the will.
In this and the remaining points of Dr. Planck's theory we shall
consider the second part of his antinomy, human volition.
this is an internal operation we must study it

b~

Since

means of intro

spection, "that is, by the turning of the mind in on itself.•29
With Dr. Planck we call this process •our most direct and intimate source of knowledge•30 and we insist that the information
acquired in this way is most certain and valid.

For, since our

mind does know reality, as we saw in Chapter IJ,31 it must have
most certain knowledge of that reality which is closest and most
evident to it.
Now introspection reveals many internal acts of the will:
emotional states such as fear and love, deliberation, consultation, resolution, choice.

The following description of choice

agrees perfectly with what each of us knows from his own internal experience.
The acceptance of some suggested course
or its rejection constitutes the act of
choice. For this exercise of choice
there must be the self-conscious reflective cognizance of at least two possible
alternatives, though one may be mere ab-
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stinence from action.32
When we consent to either of these conflicting desires, we experience an active interposition of the Ego through
which the issue of the conflict is decided. 33
Choice, then, as our consciousness reveals it, consists in
selecting one of several alternatives.

But the same tthuman con-

sciousness"34 which reveals to us the f!.Q!_ of choice reveals also
the evidence for the freedom of choice.

We know that several mo-

tives frequently present them.selves and that we are not passive
spectators while one or other inevitably moves our w111.35

We

see ourselves taking an active part, considering each alternative
examining the prospective results, weighing the objective value
of the inducements.

All this activity, however, is ineffica-

cious until by an "active interposition of the Egon36 we
strengthen one of the motives and decide to act upon it.
Motive, according to the testimony of our consciousness, is
not something mechanical, not a compelling necessity like force
in nature.

The clearest and most certain evidence shows that mo-

tive is nothing but some good, attractive, indeed, but not necessitating. We do act for motives but we are not forced by them. It
is true, of course, that sometimes we are so carried away by love
or excitement that we can act in only one way.

Yet we readi·ly

distinguish such events from our ordinary calm decisions. It is
likewise true that temperament, health, "physical and psychic influences"37 do affect our decisions.

These factors do not neces-

sitate them, however; indeed, we praise most highly a man who
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overcomes these internal impulses and does what he knows is right
And thus, since we cannot deny that consciousness testifies truly, we must maintain that the freedom which it reveals in our
actions is as real as the existence of the will itself.

Dr.

Planck's second point, that motive determines conduct, therefore;
is inadmissible.
His third point, that a superior intelligence could predict
our activity if it knew all the motives which influence us, falls
before the testimony of introspection.

Since motives are not

psychic forces but attractions to objects which we may choose or
reject, they do not impel one to any particular course of action.·
Hence no created intelligence, just from examining the motives
in a man's will, can forecast with absolute certitude what he will
do under given circumstances.

However, it must be admitted that

the normal person can be relied upon to follow certain courses
and that this stability can give us grounds·for a type of conditioned certitude called moral certitude.38
We are sure, for example, that the cook will not poison the
dinner, that a man will take ordinary care to preserve his life,
that a mother will love her children.
mal result of healthy human nature.

Such actions are the norSince this nature is found

in every man, it is safe to say that under ordinary circumstancee
a man will follow the natural instincts of that nature. This fact
gives value to the predictions of the "sciences which deal with
human events.n39

When the sociologist predicts, he does so be-
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cause he relies on the saneness of his subjects, not because he
denies free will.

And the fact that occasionally a man does vio-

late one of the primary instincts of human nature is proof both
that the certitude of the sociologist is conditioned and that the
beings with which he deals are free.
We must conclude, then, that a superior intelligence could
not predict a man's actions from the knowledge of the motives
present in his will.

To assert such predictability is to deny

human freedom, which we have already proved.

However, moral cer-

titude, which is based on the normal workings of human nature,
can be had even by men.
Dr. Planck's fourth point, that individual freedom consists
in feeling free, is the most important tenet of his whole system,

tor on the nature of human freedom depends all that he has said
and all that he will say.

If freedom means nothing but an inter-

nal persuasion that we are not subject to necessity, then there
is nothing to prevent us from being bound in reality 'By inescapable physical force.

However, let us see whether freedom

really does mean a mere subjective illusion.
Certainly, men generally do not understand by freedom a feeling that one is free.

"Free-will, as common sense understands

this term, may be defined as the power .Q! self-determination. •40
This power is as real as anything in the world about us, at least
in the ordinary judgment of men.

The culprit who is given physi-

cal punishment for abusing liberty is not conscious that his free
act is any less real than the penalty. On the other hand, the lu-
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free,41 while the cautious judge may feel harassed by a dozen
different motives.

Yet we know that the former is deluded and

the latter really free.

Finally, if we reduce freedom to an in-

ternal illusion, then our consciousness deceives us and scepticism is the only logical consequence.

Of course, it is

our consciousness does not immediately experience the capacity o
free choice, but it does see the evidence of freedom - that certain of our actions "depend on our consent.•42

If we are to

the value of this evidence, then we must admit that the mind
of itself, and this is one admission which we cannot make.43
Freedom, therefore, does not consist in feeling free.

If it

did, it would scarcely merit the attention of philosophy. Freeda
is something objective; it is a power or capacity in man to determine his own activity.

This is the meaning of freedom in the

daily usage of man, this is freedom as it is revealed to us by
consciousness.
an illusion.

Dr. Planck surely would not say that the will is
Yet the same consciousness which reveals the exis-

tence of the will reveals to us that we are free. There is no
reason to call the former a fact, the latter an illusion, and
hence we must conclude that Dr. Planck is wrong in asserting tha
human freedom means nothing more than a feeling that we are free.
Dr. Planck's fifth

poin~

is that the individual feels free

while he is. objectively determined.

We have shown, however,that

freedom does not consist in feeling free but in having the "abil
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i tY to settle the issue between conflicting motives by the active
interposition of the Ego.•44

We also proved that man really has

this freedom when we saw that the same consciousness which reveals the existence of choice reveals its freedom.

Hence the as-

sertion that the individual feels free while he is objectively
determined is inadmissible.
Dr. Planck's final point, that each act of reflection is an
unperceived determination of the will and hence that we can never
know that we are necessitated, rests upon the opinion that this
reflection provides a motive which disturbs the will and thus
inclines it to another course.

Such, however, is not in accord

with the nature of motive as revealed by consciousness.

Not

every mental act is a motive, but only those whose object offers
some attraction to the will.

An ordinary act of reflection evi-

dently does not fall into this category.

We must deny that re-

flection is comparable to a beam of light which disturbs the velocity of a particle while measuring its position.45 This analog
is not borne out by consciousness but is an unsupported assertio
which is contradicted by all that we know of motives from introspection.
Of course, it is possible that in certain cases reflection
would disturb the subject who is choosing.

Yet we clearly dis-

tinguish such events from the normal consciousness of our activities.

Dr. Planck's sixth point, therefore, that each act of

reflection by disturbing the will prevents us from ever seeing
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that we are necessitated, cannot be admitted.
In this chapter we have considered that portion of Dr.
Planck's theory of causation which deals with the apparent antinomy between the principle of causality and human free will.
we have noted that this principle may not be taken to mean
cause must act under the requisite conditions."

"Ever~

We were able to

establish the existence of human freedom and were obliged to reject Dr. Planck's opinion that man's will is really though unperceivably determined.

-62-

Notes to Chapter IV
1. Cf. B. Wuellner, S.J., Ontologia (MS.), Thesis 23, p. l; p.29
of this thesis.
2. Max Planck, Where is Science Going?, p. 107.
3. Idem, p. 108.
4. Idem, p. 107, 108.
5. Cf. Where is Science Going?, p. 108, 110, 111, 112, 113, 117.
6. Idem, p. 113.

7. Idem, p. 107.
8. Idem.
9. Idem •.
10. Idem, p. 108.
11. Idem, p. 117.
12. Cf. Idem, p. 132.
13. Idem, p. 147.
14. Idem.
15. Idem, p. 150.
16. Cf. Idem,

p~

140.

17. Idem, p. 152.
18. Idem, p. 152, 153.
19. Idem, p. 153.
20. Idem, p. 158.
21. Max Planck, The Universe in the Light of Modern Physics,
translated by W. H.Johnston,Norton,New York,1931, p. 90,91.
22. Idem, p. 91, 92.
23. Where is Science Going?, p. 163.

24. Max Planck, The Philosophy .Qi. Ph:roics, p. BO.

25. Idem, p. Z.3.
26. Cf.

~ere.!§.

Science Going?, p. 136, 140.

2?. ldf!!l, p. 150.

26. Cf. J. Frobes, S.J., Psyohologia Speeulativa, Herdor,F:riburc;,
1927 1 Tonue II, p. 192 - 196.
29. !!:.. imher, s.J., Psyoholop..Y, Longnans, London, ninth od1 t1on,
192:3, P• ll.
30. '"hore

ll. Science Goinr;'?,

p. 10?.

31. Cf. p. 25 - 27 of this thesis avid, on the validity of the

testimony of consciouaneaa, c.Frick,s.J.,Logica,ed. 7a,
p. 181 - 192.

32.

ri.

~laher,

s .J.,

op. cit., p. 382.

33. n. Gruender, ~.J., Experirl(!mtaJ. Paycbolops,nruce, 2:!11'.7aukee,
1932, p. 400.

54.

U'h~re

ll. Science Going?,

P• 107.

s.J., op. cit., To.mus II,
36. H. Gruender, s.J., op. cit., p •. 400.
3B. Cf. J. '.!?robes,

3?.

~ere

:.ss. er. c.
~.9. -where

p. 176.

.!§.Science Going?, p. 152.
Frick,

s.J.,

op •. oit., p. 139.- 149.

ll. Soi ence Going?•

p. 150.

s.J., op. cit., p. 428.
Fr0bes, s.1., op. cit., Tomus

40. H. Gruender,
41. Cf. J.

42. II. Gruender, s.J., op. cit., p. 435.
43. Cf. p. 25 1 26 of this thesis.

44. H. Gruender,
45. Cf.

!h!

s.s ••

op. cit., p. 428.

Philosophy of Physics, p.

so.

II, p. 211.

-64CONCLUSION
With the examination of Dr. Planck's views on causality and
free will we conclude our critique of his theory of causation.
We have endeavored in these pages to sketch the setting, origin,
and principal tenets of Dr. Planck's explanation of causality in
nature. His theory was occasioned,as we have seen, by the failure
of scientific prediction of events, after that prediction had become identified with causality.
Throughout his theory, however, Dr. Planck has tended towards
the same identification.

After assuming the existence of the

real world he fastens on predictability as the sole criterion of
causality, and then endeavors to explain our inability to predict.

Similarly, he believes that an uncaused contingent event

is not self-contradictory (since an unpredictable event is not
intrinsecally repugnant), and therefore maintains that the principle of causality is not universal but to be maintained by science only when circumstances justify - in other words, when science has found that it can predict.

Finally, Dr. Planck believes

human activity to be scientifically predictable, and therefore
tries to reconcile determinism with our consciousness of freedom.
The writer of this thesis has endeavored to establish anothe1
approach to the problem of causality - the seeking of sufficient
reason for change.

Every new being requires a sufficient reason

and therefore the principle of causality is universal.

Certain

changes result from natural bodies; these act necessarily, in

-65accord with their nature.

Here predictability, at best an exter-

nal sign of internal necessity, may be had.

Other changes are

due to human beings; these act freely, in. accord with their nature.

Predictability of their activities is moral certitude.

The necessity o:f physical causality and the freedom of hum.an
causality are established from facts available to all.

To pre-

sent these facts, to test Dr. Planck's theory with them, and to
show the strength and weakness of that theory has been the purpose of this thesis.
has been accomplished.

It is the writer's hope that this purpose
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